000			01044pab a2200181 454500
008			180718b2007 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aAnthon, Signe
245			_aA bureaucrats procurement strategy: budget constraints and rationing
260			_c2007
300			_ap.221-44.
520			_aWe investigate a bureaucratic principal responsible for the procurement of goods and services from private agents. the bureaucrat is evaluated on output and controlled by a limited budget. The agents maximize profit, have private information about variable production costs, and have positive outside options which are lost upon acceptance of a procurement contract. The setting is relevant for, e.g. governmental agencies. We show how this setup makes probabilistic rationing and overproduction for low-cost agents a useful tool for the bureaucrat. - Reproduced.
650			_aBureaucracy
700			_aThorsen, Jellesmark
700			_aBogetoft, Peter
773			_aAnnals of Public and Cooperative Economics
908			_aN
909			_a74758
999			_c74758 _d74758