000			01125pab a2200181 454500
008			180718b2008 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aKonrad, Kai A.
245			_aTime consistency and bureaucratic budget competition
260			_c2008
300			_ap.1-15.
362			_aJan
520			_aHigh employment protection in the public sector results in strategic over-employment if government divisions compete for budgets in a dynamic setting. Bureaucrats who are interested in maximising their divisions output employ excess labour, since this induces the sponsor to provide complementary inputs in the future. Restrictions on hiring decisions in the public sector can be regarded as provisions to reduce strategic hiring. We also provide evidence from a survey of decision makers in a public sector bureaucracy with very high employment protection. The results confirm that decision makers are aware of the strategic effects of their hiring decisions on budget allocation. - Reproduced.
650			_aCivil service
700			_aKessing, Sebastian G.
773			_aEconomic Journal
908			_aN
909			_a77868
999			_c77868 _d77868