000			01100pab a2200169 454500
008			180718b2009 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aleaver, Clare
245			_aBureaucratic minimal squawk behavior: theory and evidence from regulatory agencies
260			_c2009
300			_ap.572-607.
362			_aJun
520			_aThis paper develops a model in which a desire to avoid criticism prompts otherwise public-spirited bureaucrats to behave inefficiently. Decisions are taken to keep interest groups quiet and to keep mistakes out of the public eye. The policy implications of this "minimal squqawk" behavior are at odds with the view that agencies should be structured to minimize the threat of "capture". An empirical test using data from US State Public Utility Commissions rejects the capture hypothesis and is consistent with the squawk hypothesis: longer PUC terms of office are associated with a higher incidence of rate reviews and lower household electricity bills. - Reproduced.
650			_aCivil service
773			_aAmerican Economic Review
908			_aN
909			_a83570
999			_c83570 _d83570