| 000 | 01113pab a2200181 454500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 008 | 180718b2009 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 100 | _aWittman, Donald | ||
| 245 | _aHow pressure groups activate voters and move candidates closer to the median | ||
| 260 | _c2009 | ||
| 300 | _ap.1324-343. | ||
| 362 | _aOct | ||
| 520 | _aThis article shows how uninformed but rational voters can respond intelligently to political advertising. The article models a situation where a candidate must rely on a pressure group for financing political advertising and making endorsements. The pressure group uses its power over the purse to influence the position chosen by the candidate. Nevertheless, when uninformed voters use a strategic rule of thumb, pressure-group contributions always move the outcome of the election closer to the median voter. By using such a rule of thumb, when there is advertising, uninformed voters can have the same influence on the election as informed voters. - Reproduced. | ||
| 650 | _aElections | ||
| 650 | _aInterest groups | ||
| 773 | _aEconomic Journal | ||
| 908 | _aN | ||
| 909 | _a84194 | ||
| 999 |
_c84194 _d84194 |
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