000			01509pab a2200193 454500
008			180718b2009 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aJeong, Gyung-Ho
245			_aClosing the deal: negotiating civil rights legislation
260			_c2009
300			_ap.588-606.
362			_aNov
520			_aOur investigation of the Senate politics of four major civil rights acts indicates that they did not result from winning coalitions bulldozing helpless minorities, nor did they result from some unpredictable chaotic process. These critical bills were the result of a flexible, multidimensional coalition-building process that proceeded by offering amendments carefully constructed to split off pivotal members of the winning coalition. Ideal point estimates of U.S. senators reveal that this coalitional negotiation process led to outcomes at some distance from the first choice of the winning coalition, testimony to significant compromise, both in early proposals and in refinements. This negotiation process resulted in outcomes apparently constrained by the boundaries of the uncovered set (McKelvey 1986; Miller 1980). "Closing the deal" in the US Senate meant finding an outcome that could withstand robust attacks on pivotal coalition members - and that meant finding an outcome in the uncovered set. - Reproduced.
650			_aCivil and political rights
700			_aSened, Itai
700			_aMiller, Gary J.
773			_aAmerican Political Science Review
908			_aN
909			_a85645
999			_c85645 _d85645