000			01482pab a2200181 454500
008			180718b2011 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aZelekha, Yaron
245			_aFixers as shadow "public servants": A case study of Israel
260			_c2011
300			_ap.617-630.
362			_ajul-sep
520			_aFixers can thrive in any level of political, bureaucractic, or insitutional development. Paradoxically the academic research of the phenomenon of fixers is in its infancy. There exists no accepted definition of fixers; the boundaries between fixers and lobbysists remain murky, in terms of comparative administration only limited knowledge about the forces that breed different types of fixers in different political settings is available; and no deductive theory was articulated that might determine when and how fixing might become dysfunctional and corruptive. In an attempt to better understand the phenomenon of fixers more theortically; this study analyzes fixers in view of threee theories of bureaucratic corruption, and in view of the emerging theoru of altenative politics. Using Israel as a case in point, the study shows that within certain national and local branches of government fixers not only create a shadow copy of official institutions, but also foster institutional corruption. - Reproduced.
650			_aCivil service
700			_aWerner, Simcha
773			_aInternational Journal of Public Administration
908			_aN
909			_a94211
999			_c94211 _d94211