000 01348pab a2200205 454500
008 180718b2011 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 _aVita, Giuseppe Di
245 _aCurbing corruption in public administration: A case study from Italy
260 _c2011
300 _ap.631-645.
362 _ajul-sep
520 _aThe aim of this article is to verify whether the historic sentence, no. 500/1999 of the Italian Legitimacy Court (Corte di Cassazione) in Plenary Session, may have contributed to diminshing bribery in Italy, by increasing the area of liability for both civil servants and the public administration. The empirical analysis is based on a case study conducted in Sicily, in the province of Catania, using a unique data set. The main results of the article are: paying bureaucrats by means of an incentive wage regimes may not be effective in reducing corruption; an extension of the liablity rule for the public administration and civil servants may discourage the phenomenon of bribery; and, the perfect specification o f property rights helps to reduced corruption. - Reproduced.
650 _aCorruption - Case studies
650 _aPublic administration - Italy
650 _aCorruption - Italy
650 _aCorruption
773 _aInternational Journal of Public Administration
908 _aN
909 _a94212
999 _c94212
_d94212