000			01456pab a2200181 454500
008			180718b2012 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBrandsma, Gijs Jan
245			_aThe effect of information on oversight: the European Parliament's response to increasing information on comitology decision-making
260			_c2012
300			_ap.74-92.
362			_aMar
520			_aThe European Parliament, like any; parliament, needs information for scrutinizing executive decision-making. But how does it process this information in practice? This article focuses on the European Parliament's increasing grip on 'comitology' decision-making: committees composed of national civil servants, producing executive measures that are adopted by the European Commission. Two types of changes are addressed: organizational changes and changes in working methods of EP staff. The analysis shows that the European Parliament has effectively built up a system of decentralized police-patrol oversight, but not following more information rights as such but rather as a result of its increasing political powers. The article concludes that information only affects the behaviour of the European Parliament in combination with very specific as opposed to quite general or diffuse political rights. - Reproduced.
650			_aAccountability
650			_aDecision making
773			_aInternational Review of Administrative Sciences
908			_aN
909			_a95830
999			_c95830 _d95830