000			01676pab a2200181 454500
008			180718b2012 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aAsthana, Anand N.
245			_aDecentralisation and corruption revisited: Evidence from a natural experiment
260			_c2012
300			_ap.27-37.
362			_aFeb
520			_aDecentralisation of powers and responsibilities from a higher to a lower level of government has been held out as an answer to a multitude of diverse political challenges. It is often assumed that as an organising principle, decentralisation reduces corruption by bringing government closer to the people. This article adds to the small literature dealing with the relationship between decentralisation and corruption by examining decentralisation of water supply from one level of sub-national government to another. It extends this literature by considering a dynamic situation and examining whether the relationship changes over time. The area of study covers the rural and semi-urban areas of two large Indian states. The study compares the level of corruption in piped water supply schemes run by centralised agencies and decentralised agencies. The study is based on experiential, not perception-based corruption measures We find that decentralisation increases corruption significantly in the immediate aftermath of decentralisation. At the same time, we observe that with time, this increase in corruption is reduced substantially, although the increase persists in the medium term. - Reproduced.
650			_aDecentralization
650			_aCorruption
773			_aPublic Administration and Development
908			_aN
909			_a97687
999			_c97686 _d97686