000			02002pab a2200205 454500
008			180718b2012 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBlunt, Peter
245			_aPatronage's progress in post-Soeharto Indonesia
260			_c2012
300			_ap.64-81.
362			_aFeb
520			_aEmpirical evidence and argument concerning governance conditions and human resource management practices indicate that since the fall of Soeharto, patronage has remained a defining feature of the governance of the Indonesian state, resulting in a condition of ﾑpatronage democracyﾒ. Decentralisation together with the symbiotic relationships that can exist between patronage and development assistance have contributed to this. The willingness of factions at the centre to make concessions to competing interests to protect the bases of their own predation (political stability, a unitary state and economic growth); the pervasiveness, inventiveness and tenacity of patronage networks; the politically constrained reach of central anti-corruption institutions; the weight of factional, donor and contractor self-interest; the relative ease with which real intentions can be masked and politically correct appearances can be maintained; and the strength and convenience of (mistaken) neo-institutionalist convictions concerning the efficacy of technocratic reform alone all make it unlikely that patronage will be subjected in the medium term to any greater threats than it has been in the past. It is perhaps still too early to tell whether the patterns of patronage competition are moving the state towards a genuinely representative form of democracy or whether they are dragging it down into the danger zone of governance and economic stagnation. - Reprodu
650			_aHuman resources development - Indonesia
650			_aHuman resources development
700			_aLindroth, Henrik
700			_aTurner, Mark
773			_aPublic Administration and Development
908			_aN
909			_a97690
999			_c97689 _d97689