000			01866pab a2200193 454500
008			180718b2012 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aRyu, Sangyub
245			_aWhen claimant characteristics and prior performance predict bureaucratic error
260			_c2012
300			_ap.695-714.
362			_aNov
520			_aThe public administration literature has paid scant attention to bureaucratic errors as performance measures. This has largely been due to a lack of data. Unlike most programs, the insurance (UI) program has systematically collected performance data and has independently audited those data to determine error responsibility (employer, employee, and agency error). In the first comprehensive analysis of these data, we examine the probability that a bureaucrat makes an error involving nonpayment of UI benefits and theorize about the reasons for these errors. Our findings indicate that the previous UI office error rate is a good predictor of current error rates, demonstrating that poorly performing offices remain poor performers. In addition, local offices with high error rates account for a disproportionate percentage of the errors, indicating a need to examine agency management. Second, errors are more commonly made on cases involving White UI claimants and claimants with a college education. Finally, we find that claimants who have higher self-valuation, are less likely to experience agency errors. Taken together, these results point to systematic agency errors. Public managers and the unemployed would be better served if training efforts and performance targets were developed with these systematic error effects in mind. - Reproduced.
650			_aCivil service
700			_aWilkins, Vicky M.
700			_aWenger, Jeffrey B.
773			_aAmerican Review of Public Administration
908			_aN
909			_a98135
999			_c98134 _d98134