Lim Andrew S. and Fearon, James D.
The conventional balance of terror: America needs a new triad to restore its eroding deterrence - Foreign Affairs - 104(3), May-Jun, 2025: p.122-135
In 1959, the American political scientist Albert Wohlstetter argued in these pages that the United States did not possess a sufficient second-strike capability to provide stable nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union. A year later, the economist and strategist Thomas Schelling offered what has become the seminal definition of strategic nuclear stability. “It is not the ‘balance’—the sheer equality or symmetry in the situation—that constitutes mutual deterrence,” he wrote in The Strategy of Conflict. “It is the stability of the balance.” – Reproduced
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/conventional-balance-terror-lim-fearon
The conventional balance of terror: America needs a new triad to restore its eroding deterrence - Foreign Affairs - 104(3), May-Jun, 2025: p.122-135
In 1959, the American political scientist Albert Wohlstetter argued in these pages that the United States did not possess a sufficient second-strike capability to provide stable nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union. A year later, the economist and strategist Thomas Schelling offered what has become the seminal definition of strategic nuclear stability. “It is not the ‘balance’—the sheer equality or symmetry in the situation—that constitutes mutual deterrence,” he wrote in The Strategy of Conflict. “It is the stability of the balance.” – Reproduced
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/conventional-balance-terror-lim-fearon