The conventional balance of terror: America needs a new triad to restore its eroding deterrence
By: Lim Andrew S. and Fearon, James D
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: Foreign Affairs Description: 104(3), May-Jun, 2025: p.122-135.
In:
Foreign AffairsSummary: In 1959, the American political scientist Albert Wohlstetter argued in these pages that the United States did not possess a sufficient second-strike capability to provide stable nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union. A year later, the economist and strategist Thomas Schelling offered what has become the seminal definition of strategic nuclear stability. “It is not the ‘balance’—the sheer equality or symmetry in the situation—that constitutes mutual deterrence,” he wrote in The Strategy of Conflict. “It is the stability of the balance.” – Reproduced
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/conventional-balance-terror-lim-fearon
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 104(3), May-Jun, 2025: p.122-135 | Available | AR135862 |
In 1959, the American political scientist Albert Wohlstetter argued in these pages that the United States did not possess a sufficient second-strike capability to provide stable nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union. A year later, the economist and strategist Thomas Schelling offered what has become the seminal definition of strategic nuclear stability. “It is not the ‘balance’—the sheer equality or symmetry in the situation—that constitutes mutual deterrence,” he wrote in The Strategy of Conflict. “It is the stability of the balance.” – Reproduced
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/conventional-balance-terror-lim-fearon
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