Buccella, Domenico and Fanti, Luciano
Bargaining agendas as strategic tools - The Indian Journal of Labour Economics - 68(1), Jan- Mar, 2025: p.99-118
In a unionized Cournot duopoly, the present paper re-examines the subject of the bargaining scope (only wages; wages and employment levels) between firms and unions. Given the potential market deterrence effect of the efficient bargaining model, the conventional wisdom that this agenda is socially efficient can be reversed. - Reproduced
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41027-025-00565-1
efficient bargaining, right to manage, cournot duopoly, firm- union bargaining agenda
Bargaining agendas as strategic tools - The Indian Journal of Labour Economics - 68(1), Jan- Mar, 2025: p.99-118
In a unionized Cournot duopoly, the present paper re-examines the subject of the bargaining scope (only wages; wages and employment levels) between firms and unions. Given the potential market deterrence effect of the efficient bargaining model, the conventional wisdom that this agenda is socially efficient can be reversed. - Reproduced
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41027-025-00565-1
efficient bargaining, right to manage, cournot duopoly, firm- union bargaining agenda