Bargaining agendas as strategic tools
By: Buccella, Domenico and Fanti, Luciano
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: The Indian Journal of Labour Economics Description: 68(1), Jan- Mar, 2025: p.99-118.Subject(s): efficient bargaining, right to manage, cournot duopoly, firm- union bargaining agendaSummary: In a unionized Cournot duopoly, the present paper re-examines the subject of the bargaining scope (only wages; wages and employment levels) between firms and unions. Given the potential market deterrence effect of the efficient bargaining model, the conventional wisdom that this agenda is socially efficient can be reversed. - Reproduced
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41027-025-00565-1
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | Available | AR136483 |
In a unionized Cournot duopoly, the present paper re-examines the subject of the bargaining scope (only wages; wages and employment levels) between firms and unions. Given the potential market deterrence effect of the efficient bargaining model, the conventional wisdom that this agenda is socially efficient can be reversed. - Reproduced
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41027-025-00565-1
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