Askildsen, Jan-Erik
Bargaining credibility and the limits to within-firm pensions - 2003 - p.515-28. - Dec
A simple bargaining model highlights the role of commitment to a low-risk investment policy for firms which offer within-house pension and health insurance schemes. The roles of this commitment level plus bargaining power, and the ability of a failing firm to misappropriate pensions funds, are studied and their influence on the equilibrium pension determined. - Reproduced.
Social security
Pensions
Bargaining credibility and the limits to within-firm pensions - 2003 - p.515-28. - Dec
A simple bargaining model highlights the role of commitment to a low-risk investment policy for firms which offer within-house pension and health insurance schemes. The roles of this commitment level plus bargaining power, and the ability of a failing firm to misappropriate pensions funds, are studied and their influence on the equilibrium pension determined. - Reproduced.
Social security
Pensions