Bargaining credibility and the limits to within-firm pensions
By: Askildsen, Jan-Erik.
Contributor(s): Ireland, Norman J.
Material type:
ArticlePublisher: 2003Description: p.515-28.Subject(s): Social security | Pensions
In:
Annals of Public and Cooperative EconomicsSummary: A simple bargaining model highlights the role of commitment to a low-risk investment policy for firms which offer within-house pension and health insurance schemes. The roles of this commitment level plus bargaining power, and the ability of a failing firm to misappropriate pensions funds, are studied and their influence on the equilibrium pension determined. - Reproduced.
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | Volume no: 74, Issue no: 4 | Available | AR59668 |
A simple bargaining model highlights the role of commitment to a low-risk investment policy for firms which offer within-house pension and health insurance schemes. The roles of this commitment level plus bargaining power, and the ability of a failing firm to misappropriate pensions funds, are studied and their influence on the equilibrium pension determined. - Reproduced.
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