| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01138pab a2200181 454500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
180718b1999 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Meier, Kenneth J. |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Politics, bureaucracy, and farm credit |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
|---|
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
1999 |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
|---|
| Extent |
p.293-302 |
| 362 ## - DATES OF PUBLICATION AND/OR SEQUENTIAL DESIGNATION |
|---|
| Dates of publication and/or sequential designation |
Jul-Aug |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
The most common view of political institutions and their control over bureaucracy is the principal-agent model. That model assumes that politicians and bureaucrats disagree over goals and the means to obtain those goals. It also assumes that bureaucrats have access to valuable information that politicians do not have. Agricultural credit is a policy area that does not fit these assumptions. In it we find a version of bottom-line oversight, whereby the agency has clear goals and political institutions (in this case Congress) act only when serious problems occur. This "smoke detector" form of oversight is confirmed with a time series analysis of agricultural credit outputs. - Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Bureaucracy |
| 700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Wrinkle, Robert D. |
| 700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Polinard, J.L. |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Main entry heading |
Public Administration Review |
| 909 ## - |
|---|
| -- |
41935 |
