Politics, bureaucracy, and farm credit
By: Meier, Kenneth J.
Contributor(s): Wrinkle, Robert D | Polinard, J.L.
Material type:
ArticlePublisher: 1999Description: p.293-302.Subject(s): Bureaucracy
In:
Public Administration ReviewSummary: The most common view of political institutions and their control over bureaucracy is the principal-agent model. That model assumes that politicians and bureaucrats disagree over goals and the means to obtain those goals. It also assumes that bureaucrats have access to valuable information that politicians do not have. Agricultural credit is a policy area that does not fit these assumptions. In it we find a version of bottom-line oversight, whereby the agency has clear goals and political institutions (in this case Congress) act only when serious problems occur. This "smoke detector" form of oversight is confirmed with a time series analysis of agricultural credit outputs. - Reproduced
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | Volume no: 59, Issue no: 4 | Available | AR42312 |
The most common view of political institutions and their control over bureaucracy is the principal-agent model. That model assumes that politicians and bureaucrats disagree over goals and the means to obtain those goals. It also assumes that bureaucrats have access to valuable information that politicians do not have. Agricultural credit is a policy area that does not fit these assumptions. In it we find a version of bottom-line oversight, whereby the agency has clear goals and political institutions (in this case Congress) act only when serious problems occur. This "smoke detector" form of oversight is confirmed with a time series analysis of agricultural credit outputs. - Reproduced
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