| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01311nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
210226b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Johan, N. M. Lagerlof |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Hybrid all-pay and winner-pay contests |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
12(4), Nov, 2020: p.144-169 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
In many contests in economic and political life, both all-pay and winner-pay expenditures matter for winning. This paper studies such hybrid contests under symmetry and asymmetry. The symmetric model assumes very little structure but yields a simple closed-form solution. More contestants tend to lead to substitution toward winner-pay investments, and total expenditures are always lower than in the corresponding all-pay contest. With a biased decision process and two contestants, the favored contestant wins with a higher likelihood, chooses less winner-pay investments, and contributes more to total expenditures. An endogenous bias that maximizes total expenditures disfavors the high-valuation contestant but still makes her the more likely one to win. – Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior |
| 9 (RLIN) |
25714 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Main entry heading |
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
|---|
| Subject DIP |
POLITICAL PROCESSES |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
