Normal view MARC view ISBD view

Hybrid all-pay and winner-pay contests

By: Johan, N. M. Lagerlof.
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookPublisher: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Description: 12(4), Nov, 2020: p.144-169.Subject(s): Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior In: American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsSummary: In many contests in economic and political life, both all-pay and winner-pay expenditures matter for winning. This paper studies such hybrid contests under symmetry and asymmetry. The symmetric model assumes very little structure but yields a simple closed-form solution. More contestants tend to lead to substitution toward winner-pay investments, and total expenditures are always lower than in the corresponding all-pay contest. With a biased decision process and two contestants, the favored contestant wins with a higher likelihood, chooses less winner-pay investments, and contributes more to total expenditures. An endogenous bias that maximizes total expenditures disfavors the high-valuation contestant but still makes her the more likely one to win. – Reproduced
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
    average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
Item type Current location Call number Vol info Status Date due Barcode
Articles Articles Indian Institute of Public Administration
12(4), Nov, 2020: p.144-169 Available AR124474

In many contests in economic and political life, both all-pay and winner-pay expenditures matter for winning. This paper studies such hybrid contests under symmetry and asymmetry. The symmetric model assumes very little structure but yields a simple closed-form solution. More contestants tend to lead to substitution toward winner-pay investments, and total expenditures are always lower than in the corresponding all-pay contest. With a biased decision process and two contestants, the favored contestant wins with a higher likelihood, chooses less winner-pay investments, and contributes more to total expenditures. An endogenous bias that maximizes total expenditures disfavors the high-valuation contestant but still makes her the more likely one to win. – Reproduced

There are no comments for this item.

Log in to your account to post a comment.

Powered by Koha