Hybrid all-pay and winner-pay contests
By: Johan, N. M. Lagerlof
.
Material type:
BookPublisher: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Description: 12(4), Nov, 2020: p.144-169.Subject(s): Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Articles
|
Indian Institute of Public Administration | 12(4), Nov, 2020: p.144-169 | Available | AR124474 |
In many contests in economic and political life, both all-pay and winner-pay expenditures matter for winning. This paper studies such hybrid contests under symmetry and asymmetry. The symmetric model assumes very little structure but yields a simple closed-form solution. More contestants tend to lead to substitution toward winner-pay investments, and total expenditures are always lower than in the corresponding all-pay contest. With a biased decision process and two contestants, the favored contestant wins with a higher likelihood, chooses less winner-pay investments, and contributes more to total expenditures. An endogenous bias that maximizes total expenditures disfavors the high-valuation contestant but still makes her the more likely one to win. – Reproduced


Articles
There are no comments for this item.