| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01119nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
210722b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, et al |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Efficiency, justified envy, and incentives in priority-based matching |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
The American Economic Review: Insights |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
2(4), Dec, 2020: p.425-442 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
Top trading cycles (TTC ) is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof in priority-based matching, but so are other mechanisms including serial dictatorship. We show that TTC minimizes justified envy among all Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms in one-to-one matching. In many-to-one matching, TTC admits less justified envy than serial dictatorship in an average sense. Empirical evidence from New Orleans OneApp and Boston Public Schools shows that TTC has significantly less justified envy than serial dictatorship. – Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Bargaining Theory, Matching theory, Allocative efficiency, Cost-benefit analysis |
| 9 (RLIN) |
27354 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Main entry heading |
The American Economic Review: Insights |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
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| Subject DIP |
BARGAINING THEORY |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
