Efficiency, justified envy, and incentives in priority-based matching
By: Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, et al
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: The American Economic Review: Insights Description: 2(4), Dec, 2020: p.425-442.Subject(s): Bargaining Theory, Matching theory, Allocative efficiency, Cost-benefit analysis
In:
The American Economic Review: InsightsSummary: Top trading cycles (TTC ) is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof in priority-based matching, but so are other mechanisms including serial dictatorship. We show that TTC minimizes justified envy among all Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms in one-to-one matching. In many-to-one matching, TTC admits less justified envy than serial dictatorship in an average sense. Empirical evidence from New Orleans OneApp and Boston Public Schools shows that TTC has significantly less justified envy than serial dictatorship. – Reproduced
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 2(4), Dec, 2020: p.425-442 | Available | AR124894 |
Top trading cycles (TTC ) is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof in priority-based matching, but so are other mechanisms including serial dictatorship. We show that TTC minimizes justified envy among all Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms in one-to-one matching. In many-to-one matching, TTC admits less justified envy than serial dictatorship in an average sense. Empirical evidence from New Orleans OneApp and Boston Public Schools shows that TTC has significantly less justified envy than serial dictatorship. – Reproduced
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