| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01286nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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220919b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Singh, Sanjay Kumar |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
A game theoretic analysis for Ladakh standoff, 2020 |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
Journal of Defence Studies |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
16(1), Jan-Mar, 2022: p.3-18 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
A game theoretic analysis for Ladakh standoff is presented in this article. Starting with Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, a more flexible game, known as De-escalation game,1 is derived by incorporating the concepts of retaliation and non-escalation probabilities in the PD game. It is shown that by including these concepts, many new possibilities open up for India, which permit it to impose penalty on the aggressor. The intensity of retaliatory actions may be tailored according to the perceived threat; and this strategy allows India to dissuade the aggressor without risking a war or accepting defeat. Finally, options available to India in the light of game theoretic analysis are presented in the article. – Reproduced
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| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
India–China disputes, Game theory, De-escalation game, Co-operative Nash equilibrium. |
| 9 (RLIN) |
33234 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
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| Main entry heading |
Journal of Defence Studies |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
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| Subject DIP |
INDIA - FOREIGN RELATIONS - CHINA |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
