| 000 -LEADER |
| fixed length control field |
01495nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
| fixed length control field |
221228b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
| Personal name |
Hou, Linke, Liu, Mingxing and Zhang, Dong |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
| Title |
Top-down accountability, social unrest, and anticorruption in China |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
American Review of Public Administration |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
| Extent |
52(6), Aug, 2022: p.423-438 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
| Summary, etc |
What motivates front-line officials to curtail corruption? We contend that performance management can reinforce top-down accountability in authoritarian governments and help contain corruption at the local level. Drawing on a nationally representative panel data of approximately 120 villages in China, we find that when anticorruption is prescribed as a salient policy goal in the township-to-village performance evaluation, village officials are incentivized to curb corruption. We further present evidence that the mandate for maintaining social stability propels township-level governments to prioritize the anticorruption work in the performance evaluation of village officials given that corruption constitutes a crucial trigger for social unrest. Our study sheds light on the understanding of performance management, bureaucratic accountability, and anticorruption policies in authoritarian countries. – Reproduced |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Performance management, Anticorruption, social unrest, China |
| 9 (RLIN) |
34935 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
| Main entry heading |
American Review of Public Administration |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
| Subject DIP |
CORRUPTION |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
| Item type |
Articles |