Top-down accountability, social unrest, and anticorruption in China
By: Hou, Linke, Liu, Mingxing and Zhang, Dong
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: American Review of Public Administration Description: 52(6), Aug, 2022: p.423-438.Subject(s): Performance management, Anticorruption, social unrest, China
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American Review of Public AdministrationSummary: What motivates front-line officials to curtail corruption? We contend that performance management can reinforce top-down accountability in authoritarian governments and help contain corruption at the local level. Drawing on a nationally representative panel data of approximately 120 villages in China, we find that when anticorruption is prescribed as a salient policy goal in the township-to-village performance evaluation, village officials are incentivized to curb corruption. We further present evidence that the mandate for maintaining social stability propels township-level governments to prioritize the anticorruption work in the performance evaluation of village officials given that corruption constitutes a crucial trigger for social unrest. Our study sheds light on the understanding of performance management, bureaucratic accountability, and anticorruption policies in authoritarian countries. – Reproduced
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 52(6), Aug, 2022: p.423-438 | Available | AR127795 |
What motivates front-line officials to curtail corruption? We contend that performance management can reinforce top-down accountability in authoritarian governments and help contain corruption at the local level. Drawing on a nationally representative panel data of approximately 120 villages in China, we find that when anticorruption is prescribed as a salient policy goal in the township-to-village performance evaluation, village officials are incentivized to curb corruption. We further present evidence that the mandate for maintaining social stability propels township-level governments to prioritize the anticorruption work in the performance evaluation of village officials given that corruption constitutes a crucial trigger for social unrest. Our study sheds light on the understanding of performance management, bureaucratic accountability, and anticorruption policies in authoritarian countries. – Reproduced
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