| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
01075nam a22001457a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
230411b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Kubitz, Greg |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Two-stage contests with private information |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
15(1), Feb, 2023: p.239-287 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
In perfectly discriminating contests with private information, low-ability contestants prefer to appear strong, while high-ability contestants prefer to appear weak. In a two-stage contest, this leads to a unique symmetric equilibrium with partial pooling in the first stage. A higher output in the first contest leads to a weakly higher belief about the contestant's ability entering the second contest. We characterize this unique equilibrium when cost of effort is linear and show how the prize allocation and type distribution impact contestants' expected output, payoffs, and the probability of surprise victories.- Reproduced |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
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| Main entry heading |
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
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| Subject DIP |
PRIVATE INFORMATION |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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| Item type |
Articles |
