Two-stage contests with private information
By: Kubitz, Greg
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Description: 15(1), Feb, 2023: p.239-287.
In:
American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsSummary: In perfectly discriminating contests with private information, low-ability contestants prefer to appear strong, while high-ability contestants prefer to appear weak. In a two-stage contest, this leads to a unique symmetric equilibrium with partial pooling in the first stage. A higher output in the first contest leads to a weakly higher belief about the contestant's ability entering the second contest. We characterize this unique equilibrium when cost of effort is linear and show how the prize allocation and type distribution impact contestants' expected output, payoffs, and the probability of surprise victories.- Reproduced
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 15(1), Feb, 2023: p.239-287 | Available | AR128618 |
In perfectly discriminating contests with private information, low-ability contestants prefer to appear strong, while high-ability contestants prefer to appear weak. In a two-stage contest, this leads to a unique symmetric equilibrium with partial pooling in the first stage. A higher output in the first contest leads to a weakly higher belief about the contestant's ability entering the second contest. We characterize this unique equilibrium when cost of effort is linear and show how the prize allocation and type distribution impact contestants' expected output, payoffs, and the probability of surprise victories.- Reproduced
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