Slope takers in anonymous markets (Record no. 525203)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 00995nam a22001457a 4500
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 240214b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Quint, Daniel and Weretka, Marek
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Slope takers in anonymous markets
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 15(4), Nov, 2023: p.306-318
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc We present a learning-based selection argument for Linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a Walrasian auction. Endowments vary stochastically; traders model residual supply as linear, estimate its slope from past trade data, and periodically update these estimates. In the standard setting with quadratic preferences, we show that this learning process converges to the unique LBN. Anonymity and statistical learning therefore support this commonly used equilibrium selection rule.- Reproduced

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20220078
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP ECONOMICS
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2024-02-14 15(4), Nov, 2023: p.306-318 AR131039 2024-02-14 Articles

Powered by Koha