Slope takers in anonymous markets
By: Quint, Daniel and Weretka, Marek
.
Material type: 
BookPublisher: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Description: 15(4), Nov, 2023: p.306-318.
In:
American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsSummary: We present a learning-based selection argument for Linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a Walrasian auction. Endowments vary stochastically; traders model residual supply as linear, estimate its slope from past trade data, and periodically update these estimates. In the standard setting with quadratic preferences, we show that this learning process converges to the unique LBN. Anonymity and statistical learning therefore support this commonly used equilibrium selection rule.- Reproduced
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20220078
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Articles
|
Indian Institute of Public Administration | 15(4), Nov, 2023: p.306-318 | Available | AR131039 |
We present a learning-based selection argument for Linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a Walrasian auction. Endowments vary stochastically; traders model residual supply as linear, estimate its slope from past trade data, and periodically update these estimates. In the standard setting with quadratic preferences, we show that this learning process converges to the unique LBN. Anonymity and statistical learning therefore support this commonly used equilibrium selection rule.- Reproduced
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20220078
There are no comments for this item.