How electoral cycles shape the implementation of public works programs: Evidence from India (Record no. 526798)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02015nam a22001577a 4500
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 240626b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Thomas, Anjali and Darsey, Jonathan
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title How electoral cycles shape the implementation of public works programs: Evidence from India
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc Political Research Quarterly
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 77(1), Mar, 2024: p.106-120
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc Why do public works programs in developing democracies often experience implementation failures at the local level? Building on the literature on political business cycles, our study sheds light on a key explanation. We argue that electoral cycles undermine the completion of public works projects because of incumbents’ difficulties in reaping electoral rewards for following through on projects proposed just prior to an election. Analyses based on project-level data from a nation-wide public program in India supports the argument. We find that projects proposed close to an upcoming election are less likely to be eventually completed than projects proposed at other times. We further find that incumbent turnover exacerbates the effect of electoral cycles and that this modifying effect is plausibly causal. The results suggest that new incumbents have reduced incentives to follow through on projects proposed by their predecessors due to the difficulties involved with claiming credit for such projects.- Reproduced

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/10659129231195079
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Public works programs, Electoral cycles, Implementation failure, Developing democracies, Political business cycles, Incumbent turnover, Project completion, Electoral incentives, Credit claiming, India, Local governance, Public infrastructure, Democratic accountability, Timing of proposals, Causal inference, Political economy, Program effectiveness, Project-level data, Government transitions, Policy discontinuit
9 (RLIN) 55206
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading Political Research Quarterly
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP LOCAL GOVERNMENT
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2024-06-26 77(1), Mar, 2024: p.106-120 AR132364 2024-06-26 Articles

Powered by Koha