How electoral cycles shape the implementation of public works programs: Evidence from India
By: Thomas, Anjali and Darsey, Jonathan
.
Material type: 
BookPublisher: Political Research Quarterly Description: 77(1), Mar, 2024: p.106-120.Subject(s): Public works programs, Electoral cycles, Implementation failure, Developing democracies, Political business cycles, Incumbent turnover, Project completion, Electoral incentives, Credit claiming, India, Local governance, Public infrastructure, Democratic accountability, Timing of proposals, Causal inference, Political economy, Program effectiveness, Project-level data, Government transitions, Policy discontinuit
In:
Political Research QuarterlySummary: Why do public works programs in developing democracies often experience implementation failures at the local level? Building on the literature on political business cycles, our study sheds light on a key explanation. We argue that electoral cycles undermine the completion of public works projects because of incumbents’ difficulties in reaping electoral rewards for following through on projects proposed just prior to an election. Analyses based on project-level data from a nation-wide public program in India supports the argument. We find that projects proposed close to an upcoming election are less likely to be eventually completed than projects proposed at other times. We further find that incumbent turnover exacerbates the effect of electoral cycles and that this modifying effect is plausibly causal. The results suggest that new incumbents have reduced incentives to follow through on projects proposed by their predecessors due to the difficulties involved with claiming credit for such projects.- Reproduced
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/10659129231195079
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Articles
|
Indian Institute of Public Administration | 77(1), Mar, 2024: p.106-120 | Available | AR132364 |
Why do public works programs in developing democracies often experience implementation failures at the local level? Building on the literature on political business cycles, our study sheds light on a key explanation. We argue that electoral cycles undermine the completion of public works projects because of incumbents’ difficulties in reaping electoral rewards for following through on projects proposed just prior to an election. Analyses based on project-level data from a nation-wide public program in India supports the argument. We find that projects proposed close to an upcoming election are less likely to be eventually completed than projects proposed at other times. We further find that incumbent turnover exacerbates the effect of electoral cycles and that this modifying effect is plausibly causal. The results suggest that new incumbents have reduced incentives to follow through on projects proposed by their predecessors due to the difficulties involved with claiming credit for such projects.- Reproduced
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/10659129231195079
There are no comments for this item.