Strategic incentives and the optimal sale of information (Record no. 527132)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01718nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 240805b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Olivera, Rosina Rodríguez |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Strategic incentives and the optimal sale of information |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
| Extent | 16(2). May, 2024: p.296-353 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc | A monopolist data seller offers information to privately informed data buyers. I characterize the seller's optimal menu, which screens between two types of buyers. Buyers' preferences for information allow the seller to extract all surplus, and the optimal menu's features are determined by the interaction between buyers' strategic incentives and the correlation of their private information. The seller offers perfect information to the buyer with the highest willingness to pay and partial information, which makes this type indifferent. Both experiments are informative even when buyers have congruent beliefs if they have coordination (anticoordination) incentives and their private information is negatively (positively) correlated.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20210372 |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Data markets, Information design, Monopolist seller, Buyer screening, Optimal menu, Strategic incentives, Private information, Surplus extraction, Information correlation, Willingness to pay, Perfect information, Partial information, Coordination incentives, Anticoordination incentives, Belief congruence, Experimental design, Information asymmetry, Market segmentation, Economic theory, Incentive compatibility |
| 9 (RLIN) | 56347 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Main entry heading | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) | |
| Subject DIP | INFORMATION ECONOMICS |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Item type | Articles |
| Withdrawn status | Lost status | Source of classification or shelving scheme | Damaged status | Not for loan | Permanent location | Current location | Date acquired | Serial Enumeration / chronology | Barcode | Date last seen | Koha item type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Indian Institute of Public Administration | Indian Institute of Public Administration | 2024-08-05 | 16(2). May, 2024: p.296-353 | AR132580 | 2024-08-05 | Articles |