Strategic incentives and the optimal sale of information
By: Olivera, Rosina Rodríguez
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Description: 16(2). May, 2024: p.296-353.Subject(s): Data markets, Information design, Monopolist seller, Buyer screening, Optimal menu, Strategic incentives, Private information, Surplus extraction, Information correlation, Willingness to pay, Perfect information, Partial information, Coordination incentives, Anticoordination incentives, Belief congruence, Experimental design, Information asymmetry, Market segmentation, Economic theory, Incentive compatibility
In:
American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsSummary: A monopolist data seller offers information to privately informed data buyers. I characterize the seller's optimal menu, which screens between two types of buyers. Buyers' preferences for information allow the seller to extract all surplus, and the optimal menu's features are determined by the interaction between buyers' strategic incentives and the correlation of their private information. The seller offers perfect information to the buyer with the highest willingness to pay and partial information, which makes this type indifferent. Both experiments are informative even when buyers have congruent beliefs if they have coordination (anticoordination) incentives and their private information is negatively (positively) correlated.- Reproduced
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20210372
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 16(2). May, 2024: p.296-353 | Available | AR132580 |
A monopolist data seller offers information to privately informed data buyers. I characterize the seller's optimal menu, which screens between two types of buyers. Buyers' preferences for information allow the seller to extract all surplus, and the optimal menu's features are determined by the interaction between buyers' strategic incentives and the correlation of their private information. The seller offers perfect information to the buyer with the highest willingness to pay and partial information, which makes this type indifferent. Both experiments are informative even when buyers have congruent beliefs if they have coordination (anticoordination) incentives and their private information is negatively (positively) correlated.- Reproduced
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20210372
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