Public information is an incentive for politicians: Experimental evidence from Delhi elections (Record no. 527494)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
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| fixed length control field | 02373nam a22001577a 4500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 240902b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Banerjee, Abhijit et al |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Public information is an incentive for politicians: Experimental evidence from Delhi elections |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc | American Economic Journal: Applied Economics |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
| Extent | 16(3), Jul, 2024: p.323-353 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc | This study examines how public information influences political behavior using a randomized experiment involving Delhi municipal councillors. Two years before elections, selected councillors were informed they would be publicly evaluated via newspaper report cards. Those in high-slum areas significantly increased pro-poor spending compared to both untreated peers and treated councillors from low-slum areas. Councillors barred from rerunning in their home wards due to gender quotas were more likely to contest elsewhere if their report cards reflected strong pro-poor performance. Political parties also gained electorally from such spending. A cross-cut experiment revealed that councillors did not respond to private, undisclosed information, underscoring the power of public visibility in shaping political incentives. :Two years prior to elections, two-thirds of Delhi municipal councillors learned they had been randomly chosen for a prelection newspaper report card. Treated councillors in high-slum areas increased pro-poor spending, relative both to control counterparts and treated counterparts from low-slum areas. Treated incumbents ineligible to rerun in home wards because of randomly assigned gender quotas were substantially likelier to run elsewhere only if their report card showed a strong pro-poor spending record. Parties also benefited electorally from councillors' high pro-poor spending. In contrast, in a cross-cut experiment, councillors did not react to actionable information that was not publicly disclosed. Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20220088 |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Public Information, Political Accountability, Delhi Elections, Report Card Experiment, Pro-Poor Spending, Municipal Councillors, Slum Areas, Gender Quotas, Electoral Incentives, Transparency, Voter Awareness, Political Behavior |
| 9 (RLIN) | 57718 |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Main entry heading | American Economic Journal: Applied Economics |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) | |
| Subject DIP | PUBLIC INFORMATION |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Item type | Articles |
| Withdrawn status | Lost status | Source of classification or shelving scheme | Damaged status | Not for loan | Permanent location | Current location | Date acquired | Serial Enumeration / chronology | Barcode | Date last seen | Koha item type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Indian Institute of Public Administration | Indian Institute of Public Administration | 2024-09-02 | 16(3), Jul, 2024: p.323-353 | AR132935 | 2024-09-02 | Articles |