Public information is an incentive for politicians: Experimental evidence from Delhi elections
By: Banerjee, Abhijit et al
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics Description: 16(3), Jul, 2024: p.323-353.Subject(s): Public Information, Political Accountability, Delhi Elections, Report Card Experiment, Pro-Poor Spending, Municipal Councillors, Slum Areas, Gender Quotas, Electoral Incentives, Transparency, Voter Awareness, Political Behavior
In:
American Economic Journal: Applied EconomicsSummary: This study examines how public information influences political behavior using a randomized experiment involving Delhi municipal councillors. Two years before elections, selected councillors were informed they would be publicly evaluated via newspaper report cards. Those in high-slum areas significantly increased pro-poor spending compared to both untreated peers and treated councillors from low-slum areas. Councillors barred from rerunning in their home wards due to gender quotas were more likely to contest elsewhere if their report cards reflected strong pro-poor performance. Political parties also gained electorally from such spending. A cross-cut experiment revealed that councillors did not respond to private, undisclosed information, underscoring the power of public visibility in shaping political incentives. :Two years prior to elections, two-thirds of Delhi municipal councillors learned they had been randomly chosen for a prelection newspaper report card. Treated councillors in high-slum areas increased pro-poor spending, relative both to control counterparts and treated counterparts from low-slum areas. Treated incumbents ineligible to rerun in home wards because of randomly assigned gender quotas were substantially likelier to run elsewhere only if their report card showed a strong pro-poor spending record. Parties also benefited electorally from councillors' high pro-poor spending. In contrast, in a cross-cut experiment, councillors did not react to actionable information that was not publicly disclosed. Reproduced
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20220088
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 16(3), Jul, 2024: p.323-353 | Available | AR132935 |
This study examines how public information influences political behavior using a randomized experiment involving Delhi municipal councillors. Two years before elections, selected councillors were informed they would be publicly evaluated via newspaper report cards. Those in high-slum areas significantly increased pro-poor spending compared to both untreated peers and treated councillors from low-slum areas. Councillors barred from rerunning in their home wards due to gender quotas were more likely to contest elsewhere if their report cards reflected strong pro-poor performance. Political parties also gained electorally from such spending. A cross-cut experiment revealed that councillors did not respond to private, undisclosed information, underscoring the power of public visibility in shaping political incentives. :Two years prior to elections, two-thirds of Delhi municipal councillors learned they had been randomly chosen for a prelection newspaper report card. Treated councillors in high-slum areas increased pro-poor spending, relative both to control counterparts and treated counterparts from low-slum areas. Treated incumbents ineligible to rerun in home wards because of randomly assigned gender quotas were substantially likelier to run elsewhere only if their report card showed a strong pro-poor spending record. Parties also benefited electorally from councillors' high pro-poor spending. In contrast, in a cross-cut experiment, councillors did not react to actionable information that was not publicly disclosed. Reproduced
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20220088
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