Bank runs, fragility, and credit easing (Record no. 527840)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01140nam a22001457a 4500
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 240927b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Amador, Manuel and Bianchi, Javier
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Bank runs, fragility, and credit easing
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc The American Economic Review
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 114(7), Jul, 2024: p.2073-2110
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc We present a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model of self-fulfilling bank runs, where banks trade capital in competitive and liquid markets but remain vulnerable to runs due to a loss of creditor confidence. We characterize how the vulnerability of an individual bank depends on its leverage position and the economy-wide asset prices. We study the effect of credit easing policies, in the form of asset purchases. When a banking crisis is generated by runs, credit easing can reduce the number of defaulting banks and enhance welfare. When the crisis is driven by fundamentals, credit easing may have adverse consequences.- Reproduced

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20220328
773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Main entry heading The American Economic Review
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
Subject DIP BANKING AND FINANCE
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Item type Articles
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Permanent location Current location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Barcode Date last seen Koha item type
          Indian Institute of Public Administration Indian Institute of Public Administration 2024-09-27 114(7), Jul, 2024: p.2073-2110 AR133273 2024-09-27 Articles

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