| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01174pab a2200193 454500 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
180718b2008 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Delfgaauw, Josse |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Incentives and workers' motivation in the public sector |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
|---|
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
2008 |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
|---|
| Extent |
p.171-91. |
| 362 ## - DATES OF PUBLICATION AND/OR SEQUENTIAL DESIGNATION |
|---|
| Dates of publication and/or sequential designation |
Jan |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
Civil servants have a reputation for being lazy. However, people's personal experiences with civil servants frequently run counter to the stereotype. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in pub lic service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions. When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public sector highly attractive and may crowd out dedicated workers. When effort is verifiable, a cost-minimising government optimally attracts dedicated workers as well as the economy's laziest workers by offering separating contracts, which are both distorted. - Reproduce |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Motivation |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Public sector |
| 700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Dur, Robert |
| 773 ## - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Main entry heading |
Economic Journal |
| 908 ## - PUT COMMAND PARAMETER (RLIN) |
|---|
| Put command parameter |
N |
| 909 ## - |
|---|
| -- |
77869 |
