Incentives and workers' motivation in the public sector
By: Delfgaauw, Josse.
Contributor(s): Dur, Robert.
Material type:
ArticlePublisher: 2008Description: p.171-91.Subject(s): Motivation | Public sector
In:
Economic JournalSummary: Civil servants have a reputation for being lazy. However, people's personal experiences with civil servants frequently run counter to the stereotype. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in pub lic service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions. When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public sector highly attractive and may crowd out dedicated workers. When effort is verifiable, a cost-minimising government optimally attracts dedicated workers as well as the economy's laziest workers by offering separating contracts, which are both distorted. - Reproduce
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | Volume no: 118, Issue no: 525 | Available | AR78329 |
Civil servants have a reputation for being lazy. However, people's personal experiences with civil servants frequently run counter to the stereotype. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in pub lic service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions. When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public sector highly attractive and may crowd out dedicated workers. When effort is verifiable, a cost-minimising government optimally attracts dedicated workers as well as the economy's laziest workers by offering separating contracts, which are both distorted. - Reproduce
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