An equilibrium theory of retirement plan design
By: Bubb, Ryan and Warren, Patrick L
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: American Economic Journal Economic Policy Description: 12(2), May, 2020: p.22-45.
In:
American Economic Journal Economic PolicySummary: We develop an equilibrium theory of employer-sponsored retirement plan design using a behavioral contract theory approach. The operation of the labor market results in retirement plans that generally cater to, rather than correct, workers' mistakes. Our theory provides new explanations for a range of facts about retirement plan design, including the use of employer matching contributions and the use of default contribution rates in automatic enrollment plans that lower many workers' savings. We provide novel evidence for our theory from a sample of plans. – Reproduced
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 12(2), May, 2020: p.22-45 | Available | AR124127 |
We develop an equilibrium theory of employer-sponsored retirement plan design using a behavioral contract theory approach. The operation of the labor market results in retirement plans that generally cater to, rather than correct, workers' mistakes. Our theory provides new explanations for a range of facts about retirement plan design, including the use of employer matching contributions and the use of default contribution rates in automatic enrollment plans that lower many workers' savings. We provide novel evidence for our theory from a sample of plans. – Reproduced
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