An ecological inference approach to the origins of proportional representation
By: Penadés, Alberto and Pavía, Jose M
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: Social Science informational Description: 63(2), Jun, 2024: p.168-192.Subject(s): Proportional Representation, Ecological Inference, Electoral Reform, Vote Transfers, Boix-Rokkan Framework, Coalition Failure, Electoral Market Segmentation, Denmark 1910–1918, New Zealand 1928–1931, Political Strategy, Majority Threshold, Historical Comparative Analysis
In:
Social Science informationalSummary: This study investigates the strategic origins of proportional representation reforms in early 20th-century democracies, using a novel ecological inference method to estimate vote transfers. It argues that secular conservative and liberal parties responded to the rising socialist vote by either pooling votes to raise majority thresholds or enacting proportional representation to manage coalition risks. The authors introduce a new measure of electoral market segmentation and test a proposition from the Boix-Rokkan framework: PR reform was adopted when vote transfers signaled coalition failure. The analysis focuses on two similar cases—Denmark (1910–1918) and New Zealand (1928–1931)—which diverged in both explanatory variables and reform outcomes. Facing a prospective majority of socialists during the early third of the 20th century, some secular conservative and liberal parties pooled their votes to raise the majority threshold for the left, while others raised it by enacting some form of proportional representation. We use vote transfers, estimated by a new method of ecological inference, to explain those far-reaching choices. We provide a new conceptualization and measurement of the segmentation of the electoral market to test a proposition within the Boix-Rokkan framework: proportional representation reform was chosen when vote transfers foretold coalition failure. To substantiate our claim, we investigate two most similar cases, Denmark during 1910–1918 and New Zealand during 1928–1931, that diverged in the explanatory variable and in the response.- Reproduced
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/05390184241250179
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 63(2), Jun, 2024: p.168-192 | Available | AR132941 |
This study investigates the strategic origins of proportional representation reforms in early 20th-century democracies, using a novel ecological inference method to estimate vote transfers. It argues that secular conservative and liberal parties responded to the rising socialist vote by either pooling votes to raise majority thresholds or enacting proportional representation to manage coalition risks. The authors introduce a new measure of electoral market segmentation and test a proposition from the Boix-Rokkan framework: PR reform was adopted when vote transfers signaled coalition failure. The analysis focuses on two similar cases—Denmark (1910–1918) and New Zealand (1928–1931)—which diverged in both explanatory variables and reform outcomes. Facing a prospective majority of socialists during the early third of the 20th century, some secular conservative and liberal parties pooled their votes to raise the majority threshold for the left, while others raised it by enacting some form of proportional representation. We use vote transfers, estimated by a new method of ecological inference, to explain those far-reaching choices. We provide a new conceptualization and measurement of the segmentation of the electoral market to test a proposition within the Boix-Rokkan framework: proportional representation reform was chosen when vote transfers foretold coalition failure. To substantiate our claim, we investigate two most similar cases, Denmark during 1910–1918 and New Zealand during 1928–1931, that diverged in the explanatory variable and in the response.- Reproduced
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/05390184241250179
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