Performance and promotions in an autocracy: Evidence from Nazi Germany
By: Lasse, Aaskoven and Jacob, Nyrup
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: Comparative Politics Description: 54(1), Oct, 2021: p.51-74.Subject(s): Autocratic regimes, Meritocracy, Economic performance, Political promotion, Regime lifespan, Strategic goals, Performance monitoring, Regional leadership, Nazi Party, Gauleiters, Career trajectories, Historical data, Pre-war incentives, World War II, Authoritarian governance, Elite selection, Regime strategy, Temporal variation, Leadership rewards, Dataset analysis, Authoritarianism, Dictatorship, Totalitarianism, Political leadership, Meritocracy, Elite (Social sciences), Promotion—Political aspects, Political stability, Political culture, Patronage, Political, Regime change, Comparative government, Germany—Politics and government—1933-1945, National socialism, Nazi Party—Officials and employees, Nazi Party—History, World War, 1939-1945—Economic aspects—Germany, Economic development—Political aspects
In:
Comparative PoliticsSummary: Scholars of autocracies increasingly debate whether autocratic regimes promote their subordinates based on achievements, such as economic performance, and further a meritocratic system. This article argues that the extent to which autocratic regimes reward economic performance is not constant over the course of an autocratic regime's lifespan but varies depending on the strategic goals of the regime and the regime's ability to monitor its subordinates' performance. We collect a new dataset on the careers of the regional leaders of the German Nazi Party, the Gauleiters, from 1936 to 1944, and a wealth of historical data sources from the regime. Using this, we show that better regional economic performance increased the chance of receiving a promotion before the outbreak of World War II but not after.- Reproduced
https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/cuny/cp/2021/00000054/00000001/art00004
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 54(1), Oct, 2021: p.51-74 | Available | AR132554 |
Scholars of autocracies increasingly debate whether autocratic regimes promote their subordinates based on achievements, such as economic performance, and further a meritocratic system. This article argues that the extent to which autocratic regimes reward economic performance is not constant over the course of an autocratic regime's lifespan but varies depending on the strategic goals of the regime and the regime's ability to monitor its subordinates' performance. We collect a new dataset on the careers of the regional leaders of the German Nazi Party, the Gauleiters, from 1936 to 1944, and a wealth of historical data sources from the regime. Using this, we show that better regional economic performance increased the chance of receiving a promotion before the outbreak of World War II but not after.- Reproduced
https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/cuny/cp/2021/00000054/00000001/art00004
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