Corruption, elite contestation, and parliaments: Why do legislatures become stronger in authoritarian regimes?
By: Wiebrecht, Felix
.
Material type: 
BookPublisher: Political Research Quarterly Description: 77(1), Mar, 2024: p.255-269.Subject(s): Personalization of power, Authoritarian regimes, Legislative strength, Institutional constraints, Corruption networks, Ruling coalitions, Executive-legislative balance, Middle East, Africa, Party-based dictatorships, Military dictatorships, Electoral competitiveness, Institutional change, Elite contestation, Panel data analysis, Autocratic governance, Political institutions, Legislative empowerment, Authoritarian parliaments, Regime dynamics, Comparative politics
In:
Political Research QuarterlySummary: A growing body of literature studies the personalization of power in authoritarian regimes. Yet, how institutions can become a credible constraint to dictatorial rule is less widely studied. I theorize that corruption is a key factor associated with stronger legislatures in authoritarian regimes. By engaging in corruption, authoritarian elites in ruling coalitions can build up networks of support and influence and ultimately, use their elevated position to impel more legislative powers vis-à-vis the executive. Examining panel data on the strength of legislatures in authoritarian regimes between 1946 and 2010, I show empirically that authoritarian parliaments are stronger when levels of corruption in a given regime are high. The link between corruption and legislative strength is especially strong in the Middle East and Africa, and primarily applies to party-based and military dictatorships. More competitive electoral and legislative processes, however, do not uniformly affect parliaments’ strength. These findings contribute to our understanding of institutional changes in autocracies and highlight the centrality of elite contestations in determining institutional trajectories.- Reproduced
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/10659129231205296
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Articles
|
Indian Institute of Public Administration | 77(1), Mar, 2024: p.255-269 | Available | AR132367 |
A growing body of literature studies the personalization of power in authoritarian regimes. Yet, how institutions can become a credible constraint to dictatorial rule is less widely studied. I theorize that corruption is a key factor associated with stronger legislatures in authoritarian regimes. By engaging in corruption, authoritarian elites in ruling coalitions can build up networks of support and influence and ultimately, use their elevated position to impel more legislative powers vis-à-vis the executive. Examining panel data on the strength of legislatures in authoritarian regimes between 1946 and 2010, I show empirically that authoritarian parliaments are stronger when levels of corruption in a given regime are high. The link between corruption and legislative strength is especially strong in the Middle East and Africa, and primarily applies to party-based and military dictatorships. More competitive electoral and legislative processes, however, do not uniformly affect parliaments’ strength. These findings contribute to our understanding of institutional changes in autocracies and highlight the centrality of elite contestations in determining institutional trajectories.- Reproduced
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/10659129231205296
There are no comments for this item.